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Introduction 
The Treaty of Lisbon granted the EU a legal foundation, which is formed by the 
Treaty of the European Union (TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). The Treaty of Lisbon did not replace the existing treaties. It 
should be better said that it amended them. Nevertheless, some of the most significant 
changes that this treaty brought about can be found in the provisions of Union’s 
external relations (Broberg, 2011: 12).  
 
With the Lisbon Treaty the EU aspires to strengthen its international presence and to 
clarify the objectives of its external relations. An element of these external relations is 
considered to be the Union’s humanitarian aid policy. Actually the EU is trying to 
promote the image of “soft power” using humanitarian aid along with development 
policies. Therefore, the Treaty provides a legal basis for the provision of these two 
policies.  
 
This presentation will try to provide an overview of the changes that the Treaty of 
Lisbon brought into humanitarian aid policies. It will try to avoid a complete 
presentation of all the developments and instruments of the EU’s humanitarian aid 
policy and it will focus mostly on the political dimensions of this issue. Nevertheless, 
there must an evaluation of the development of this policy field, particularly since the 
1990s and the introduction of the ECHO in 1992, the main EU humanitarian agency. 
There will also be the examination of the EU’s response to the Haiti and Libya 
humanitarian crises. Both cases highlight not only the issues that the EU’s 
humanitarian policies face after the Lisbon Treaty, but also the Union’s role in the 
international field.  
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General overview 
The humanitarian aid policies and ECHO, although they fall within the external 
activities of the EU, they do not constitute part of the EU’s External Action Service, 
which was defined by the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty of Rome never gave formally the 
authority to the European Commission in humanitarian field and the EU’s 
humanitarian policies were connected with those of development. The establishment 
of ECHO in 1992 did not change this. Until 2004 ECHO’s work was under the control 
of DG Dev (development cooperation and humanitarian aid) and DG Relex (external 
relations),  
 
Prior, however, to 1992, The EC’s humanitarian aid policies were characterised as 
being “ad hoc and disorganised”, due to the large number of community actors 
involved in the whole process (Datar, 2011). In any case spending in the humanitarian 
area began to significantly increase since the late 1980s and humanitarian aid policies 
became an influential factor in the EU’s international policy. In early 1990s, almost 
“800m ECU, drawn from the EC budget reserve, [were] devoted to the humanitarian 
crisis in Iraq after the Gulf War of 1990–91” (Brusset and Tiberghien, 2002: 55). 
 
That period, the issue of humanitarian aid witnessed significant proliferation as a 
result of the concept of “new humanitarianism” (Versluys, 2007: 3). This new concept 
influenced issues such as the national security and sovereignty. In terms of security, 
the people replaced the state and the concept of security itself was expanded and 
covered not only political and military issues, but also, social, economic and 
environmental (UN Development Programme 1994). In that expanded concept of 
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security, the nation-state lost its monopoly of providing security in favour of new 
actors, such as international organisations, NGOs, other private are public actors and 
civil society groups (Versluys, 2007: 5). 
 
DG ECHO 
The abovementioned factors significantly influenced the creation and the development 
of the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). ECHO was 
established in 1992 but it started working in 1993 and became a legal entity in 1996 
with its own budget. Its objectives and modus operandi were defined by the Council 
regulation 1257/96 of 20 June 1996. According to this regulation, humanitarian aid 
aims “to prevent or relieve human suffering” without being “guided by, or subject to, 
political considerations…without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnic group, 
religion, age, sex, nationality or political affiliation”1
 
. Nevertheless, this regulation 
expanded ECHO’s role in areas of development policies as well, because both 
humanitarian aid and development policies were legally defined by the Article 179 of 
the TEC. This lack of separation of responsibilities during the 1990s blurred the lines 
between these two policy sectors and influenced their coherence and orientation 
(Versluys, 2007: 8).  
In 2004 ECHO became a general-directorate. In 1995, there was a separate 
Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, distinct from both foreign and development policy 
(Versluys, 2007: 20). This changed in 1999, when ECHO returned under the 
Development Commissioner, but outside the Relex Commissioner’s jurisdiction 
(Versluys, 2007: 20). This changed again in 2010 when, and under the influence of the 
                                                 
1 Council Regulation (EC) 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid, OJ L 163, 
02/07/1996, pp.1-6. 
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Lisbon Treaty, it was created a new portfolio, that of International Cooperation, 
Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response. In charge of this portfolio is nowadays the 
Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva.  
 
 ECHO’s work 
DG ECHO was established with the aim to centralise the Union’s humanitarian 
efforts. Given the fact that a significant amount of funds have to be channelled as 
soon as possible to prevent catastrophes, the creation of a single actor, which can 
organise 31 members (27 Member States plus Norway, Croatia, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein), is obviously a more effective way. DG ECHO does not implement 
humanitarian assistance itself, but it provides aid in the form of goods and services to 
the victims of natural or man-made disasters as well as conflicts outside the Union. 
Goods “may include essential supplies, specific foodstuffs, medical equipment, 
medicines and fuel”, while “services may include medical teams, water purification 
teams and logistical support” (EC, Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection). Goods and 
services reach the recipients through a range of 200 partners such as NGOs, 
international organisations (Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, UN agencies). 
 
Since 1992, ECHO via its partners has funded humanitarian aid missions in more than 
85 countries. Its grants cover emergency aid, food aid and aid to refugees and 
displaced persons and worth a total of more than €700 million per year. In 2009 the 
EU contributed over €930 million, reached about 115 million people and it was the 
world’s largest provider of humanitarian aid (COM(2011) 343 final: 2-3). In 2010 the 
initial budget of €835 million was increased several times in order to respond to new 
crises and natural disasters occurring during the year (Haiti, Pakistan; COM(2011) 
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343 final: 2-3). Apart from funding humanitarian missions, the DG ECHO is involved 
in studies, technical assistance for its partners (NGOs, IOs, UN agencies) and 
promotes and coordinates its work (EC, Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection). 
 
 Geographical distribution 
In terms of geographical distribution, in 2010, Africa received €468,5 million (i.e. 42% of 
the total final DG ECHO budget) followed by Asia, Latin America, Caribbean & Pacific 
(€440 million or 39% of the budget) the Mediterranean, Middle East, Europe and 
Caucasus (€98 million or 9 % of the budget). Multilateral capacity building, technical 
assistance, support and Civil Protection amounted to €108 million or 10% of the budget 
(DG ECHO Annual report 2010, 160). Considering the largest single funding allocations, 
in 2010 they were devoted to Sudan, Pakistan, the Palestinian territories and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DG ECHO Annual report 2010, 164-5).  
 
Moreover, DG ECHO aid strategy remains continuously focusing on “forgotten crises”: 
“situations where major humanitarian needs receive little attention on the part of the 
donors - reflected by the low level of aid received compared to the needs- and the media” 
(Caprile, A. and Hakala, 2010). The forgotten crises identified in 2010 were: Sahrawi 
refugees, the Rohingya refugees and the Chittagong Hill Tracts crisis in Bangladesh, the 
crisis in Sahel region, Jammu and Kashmir, North East India and conflicts related to 
Naxalite demands (India), Nepal, Burma/Myanmar, Yemen, the armed conflict in CAR 
and Colombia. The amount of funds allocated to 12 "forgotten crises" has been 
approximately 17 % of the budget (DG ECHO Annual report 2010: 36). 
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Developments in the EU’s humanitarian aid policy  
The establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the 
Treaty of Maastricht tried to establish a coherent external policy and provide the EU 
with an international profile. This effort, however, did not have significant success. 
Therefore, the EU considered the Humanitarian aid and Development policies as the 
proper tools to promote its “soft power” profile. So, these two policies were connected 
with the EU’s political aims, but they had to be better organised to achieve their aims, 
as there were several issues considering their application.  
 
 Humanitarian aid and development 
One of the most prominent issues the EU humanitarian aid had to face was the 
connection of humanitarian with development aid. These policies are interconnected 
and their main difference lies on the timeframe of the aid Relief needs long-term 
policies in order not to be necessary in the future, and development cannot be 
achieved when the crisis is still on the process. The Commission emphasised that 
“Better ‘development’ can reduce the need for relief; better ‘relief’ can contribute to 
development’ and better ‘rehabilitation’ can ease the transition between the two” 
(Commission, (1996) 153, p.iii)2
 
. 
 The concept of LRRD 
The concept of the linkage between relief, rehabilitation and development aimed to bridge 
the gap in the “grey zone” between humanitarian and development policies (LRRD; 
                                                 
2 European Commission, “Communication From The Commission To The Council And The European 
Parliament On Linking Relief. Rehabilitation And Development (LRRD)”, Brussels, 30.04.1996, COM 
(96) 153 final  
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COM (1996) 153). That concept was formally adopted in 20013
 
. The LRRD, however, 
proved to be highly “contentious and contradictory” (Datar, 2011: 3). Although, it aims 
to connect the two policies, in practise it did not manage to bridge the “gap” and in 
several cases lacked the funds to do so (Datar, 2011: 3). Although recently the EU 
managed to organise better short-term and long-term aid, there was also the risk of a 
confusion of priorities (Versluys, 2007: 10). A characteristic example can be found with 
the participation of local agents to the success of the whole effort. Their participation is 
very important, but this means that the local agents need more time to incorporate 
knowledge and resources (Datar, 2011: 3). This, however, forces, ECHO to stay longer in 
a country.      
 Human rights issue 
One other issue, resulted from the aims of Maastricht Treaty, was the connection of 
humanitarian aid and development policies with human rights. That connection was a 
result of the EU’s aspiration to promote its values and its profile in the world. That 
political condition, though, became a norm in determining the allocation of aid. The 
problem here is that humanitarian aid must be neutral and unconditional. Otherwise 
ECHO’s core task of saving lives was under risk (Versluys, 2007: 14). The Commission, 
eventually, took clear position in favour of the detachment of these two issue with two 
Communications in 19994 and 20015
                                                 
3Commission Communication on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An 
Assessment, COM (2001) 153.  
, linking human rights with development policies 
only (Versluys, 2007: 14). This development, however, became one more problem for 
4 European Commission (1999), Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament ‘Assessment and future of Community humanitarian activities’ (Article 20 of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96), COM (1999) 468 final.  
 
5 European Commission (2001c), Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament ‘The European Union’s Role in promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in 
Third Countries’, COM (2001) 252 final.  
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the problematic concept of LRRD. The EU could provide humanitarian aid but it could 
not continue providing development one, as the conditions did not conform to its 
requirements.   
 
 
 Issues of coordination 
One other issue of the EU’s humanitarian aid policy is the better coordination of the 
actions of all actors (EU, Member States, third parties-IOs, NGOs). In order to 
achieve this, ECHO employed several mechanisms and tools. Such examples are the 
FPAs/FAFAs and the “needs approach”. The Framework Partnership Agreements 
(FPAs/1994) were employed to speed up the process of allocating funds (Datar, 2011: 
1)6
 
. The “needs approach”, on the other hand, to assess funding allocation based on 
two national indicators, the Global Needs Assessment (GNA) and the Forgotten Crisis 
Assessment (FCA) (Datar, 2011: 2). It also tried to create a network of 
communication with the Member States (Holis 14-point system). Nevertheless, all 
these initiatives did not manage to respond as a whole to the issue of coordination and 
were partial (Daldrup et al. 2006: 15). They constituted non-binding instruments, 
which did not provide the Commission and ECHO with a real mandate to coordinate 
individual Member States’ actions (Versluys, 2007: 22-3). 
 Crisis management issue new crisis management instruments. 
Finally, there was the question of the EU’s crisis management. Military involvement 
in Humanitarian aid mission is definitely context related issue, but at the same time 
humanitarian aid is risking its impartiality, neutrality and eventually its effectiveness 
                                                 
6 ECHO in order to organise better its activities with its partners separated the FPAs into the FAFA 
(Commission/UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement) and the FPAs with NGOs and 
other International Organisations. 
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and safety. The Pettersberg Tasks, which were incorporated into the EU with the 
Amsterdam Treaty, were foreseeing the deployment of military forces for 
humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management, under the control of the 
WEU (Brusset and Tiberghien, 2002: 53). The WEU, though, never played an 
important role in implementing Petersberg Tasks and ECHO never cooperated with it 
(Brusset and Tiberghien, 2002: 53). The several man-made crises, however, indicated 
the need of a European foreign and security policy that would focus on crisis 
management (Brusset and Tiberghien, 2002: 59). The creation of the Rapid Reaction 
Force7 and Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)8
 
 were two developments towards this 
direction. Nevertheless, the issue of a “European army” threatens the EU’s profile as a 
“soft power” and demands clear political strategies, which do not always exist in the 
EU’s crisis management strategies (Versluys, 2007: 13). 
Lisbon Treaty 
The EU aimed to tackle the limitations and shortcomings of its humanitarian aid 
policy and to improve its transparency, efficiency, and international position as a 
humanitarian actor (Datar, 2011: 1). To a degree, these efforts were successful. The 
Lisbon Treaty took under consideration all these issues and incorporated several of 
the previous reforms and concepts under its provisions. One of the most important 
provisions was the introduction of a new legal basis (Art.214 TFEU) for decisions on 
humanitarian aid distinct from development policies. Nevertheless, there are still 
several issues to be answered.   
                                                 
7 ‘Headline Goals’, Helsinki European Council 1999. Along with the military branch, there were be 
incorporated other corps, military and civilian, in charge of achieving a more forceful and coherent 
European Security and Defence Policies in crises. 
8 Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001. It focuses mostly on developmental 
approaches of post conflict situations, disconnecting this way ECHO’s funding activities from 
developmental issues 
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 Legal implications 
One of the major aims of the Treaty of Lisbon was to provide a clear legal framework 
in order to reinforce its international presence and to clarify the objectives of its 
external policies. This clear legal framework introduced a new legal basis for 
humanitarian aid policies, separating them this way from the development policies. 
Before Lisbon Treaty humanitarian aid was based legally on the Article 179 of the 
TEC, which referred mainly to development assistance (Broberg, 2011: 12). Actually, 
humanitarian aid was provided by the Regulation 1257/96, which had been adopted 
on the basis of Article 179. 
 
Strictly from a legal viewpoint this regulation was severely criticised. As it was 
argued, Article 179 allows the EU to provide humanitarian aid only to developing 
countries (Broberg, 2011:  12). The Regulation 1257/96, however, has been used to 
provide humanitarian aid “to countries that cannot be classified as developing” 
(Broberg, 2011:  12). In addition, Article 179 does not provide a “required legal 
foundation for adopting measures in the field of humanitarian aid” (Broberg, 2011:  
12). The Lisbon Treaty tackled this legal criticism. Article 47 of the TEU grants the 
EU a legal personality for the first time and the Article 4(4) of TFEU defines that the 
Union has “competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy” in the 
areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid. Furthermore, the same article 
mentions that not only developing but also other countries (“third countries”) can be 
recipients of humanitarian aid (Article 214(4) TFEU).   
 
 Distinction between development and humanitarian aid 
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The establishment of clear legal bases for humanitarian aid and development policies 
is an effort to separate clearly their functioning and competences in the context of the 
Union’s external actions. With the Article 214(1), humanitarian aid focuses only on 
responding effectively to disasters and does not have “particular social or economic 
aims” (Client Earth Briefing, 2010: 5). In the Treaty of Lisbon there is no mention to 
the concept of LRRD. This omission is one more effort towards the separation of 
these two policies. It is also an indirect acknowledgement of its problematic 
application the previous years (Datar, 2011. 3). It does not, however, mean that 
development and humanitarian aid policies are not interconnected. The Article 4(4) of 
the TFEU partly replaces this omission by stating that: “the Union shall have 
competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy” in both these fields. 
Moreover, Article 21(2) of the TEU, which defines the principles and objectives of 
the EU’s external action, places under the same context both these policy sectors.  
 
 
 Coordination of the EU’s actions with the Member States and third parties  
The Treaty of Lisbon clarifies the integration of humanitarian policies and the 
cooperation among the actors involved. As it is defined in the first paragraph of 
Article 214, the EU’s operations in issues of humanitarian policies require Union and 
Member States’ actions to be “…complement and reinforce each other”. Paragraph 6, 
also, of the same article states that, in order to achieve better efficiency and 
complementarity, the Commission “may take any useful initiative to promote 
coordination between actions of the Union and those of the Member States”. The 
Union’s competence, though, does not prevent Member States exercising theirs 
(Article 4(4), Article 214(4) TFEU). Coordination, also, is envisaged in the Union’s 
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actions with other international organisations and bodies and “particular those 
forming part of the United Nations System” (214, 6).    
 
 Humanitarian aid and the EU’s values 
Due to the emergent nature of humanitarian issues, humanitarian aid is not mentioned 
in Article 3(5) of the TEU, which defines the general aims of Union actions in its 
relations with the wider world (Client Earth Briefing, 2010: 5). The same is in valid 
with the TFEU where in article 214 there is no mention to the objectives of 
humanitarian aid policies in respect to the EU’s relations with third countries (Client 
Earth Briefing, 2010: 5). The EU, although its commitment to the promotion of 
human rights, it is obvious that avoids to apply them to ECHO’s relief missions 
(Versluys, 2007: 15). In fact, the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions are highlighting the 
whole debate of the previous decades considering the connection of humanitarian aid 
and human rights and are trying to draw clear lines between these two issues.  
 
This trend is clearly stated in paragraph 2 of Article 214 of the TFEU as well. It 
should be mentioned, though, that there is instead an indirect connection between 
Humanitarian aid and human rights and this sometimes may be problematic. In the 1st 
paragraph of Article 214 it is stated that: “The Union’s operations in the field of 
humanitarian aid shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and 
objectives of the external action of the Union”. These principles are defined in 
Article 21 of the TEU as “democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human 
dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles 
of the United Nations Charter and international law”.  
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 Legislative procedure 
Considering the legislative procedure, the TFEU states in Article 214 (3) that the 
European Parliament and the Council in decisions relating humanitarian aid are 
“acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure”. The “ordinary 
legislative procedure” is the co-decision where the Commission makes a proposal 
to the European Parliament and the Council, which may reach up to three readings 
in each of the European Parliament and the Council. If both institutions reach an 
agreement following the first or second reading, the legislation will be adopted. 
Otherwise, in the third reading, it goes through a conciliation committee. The 
parliament then has the right to reject the proposal, which then becomes void. The 
procedure set out in TFEU Article 294 is almost similar to the previous co-
decision procedure based on TEC Article 251, but the position of the European 
Parliament has been partly reinforced as it is stated that “the Parliament, like the 
Council, adopts a “position” rather than an “opinion” at each stage of the 
legislative process” (Client Earth Briefing, 2010: 4).  
 
 European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps 
Finally, in paragraph 5 of the Article 214 of the TFEU it is introduced an additional 
instrument in humanitarian aid policies. This is the European Voluntary Humanitarian 
Aid Corps. This instrument will be used as a “framework for joint contributions from 
young Europeans to the humanitarian aid operations of the Union” (215,5). The rules 
and the procedures of this instrument will be determined through regulations decided 
by the European Parliament and the Council “in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure” (co-decision). The creation of this Corp is a significant change 
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in the EU’s approach towards humanitarian aid issues, as it indicates a “full circle 
back to its 1990s attempt to create a European humanitarian task force” (Datar, 2011, 
3). The EU, actually, seems to see these Corps as a mean to increase “the global 
visibility of the EU as an effective humanitarian actor” (Datar, 2011, 3). 
 
In sum, it can be said that the Lisbon Treaty codified the objectives of the EU’s 
external policies and tried to draw lines among them. Humanitarian aid and 
development policies have been both recognised as elements of this external policy, 
but at the same time they have been separated. The fact that there is no mention to the 
LRRD does not mean that that there is no linkage between these two policies. The 
Lisbon treaty from the one side provides a solid legal framework, through which the 
Union can promote its policies, and from the other one illustrates the development 
that humanitarian aid policies follow since the 1990s. In any case, Lisbon Treaty does 
not bring any new policy or instrument, with the exception of the European Voluntary 
Humanitarian Aid Corps, but at least in the future the “European Union’s legislation 
on humanitarian aid will not be met with the same legal criticism” (Broberg, 2011: 
12).  
 
Humanitarian crises after the Lisbon Treaty 
Since, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU faced several humanitarian 
crises, which tested its effectiveness. Two characteristic examples could be mentioned 
here. The one is the crisis in Haiti in 2010 and the other one is in Libya in 2011. Both 
these crises highlight issues, which concern humanitarian aid in relation with 
development, military and political objectives and coordination between the EU, the 
Member States and international organisations. The Lisbon Treaty may have provided 
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a legal framework, but in practise there are still several grey zones. In effect, it is not 
easy to disassociate ECHO’s humanitarian work from the EU’s overall political 
agenda and to draw clear lines among humanitarian aid, development assistance and 
other crisis response9
 
. These two examples, which represent humanitarian aid in 
response to a natural disaster and to a man-made one respectively, can highlight these 
issues. 
 Haiti 
The crisis in Haiti took place while the institutional changes resulting from the Lisbon 
Treaty were being put in place and the new Commission was in the process of 
nomination (Grünewald et. al., 2011: 16). Moreover, the DG ECHO had just few days 
that had incorporated into its structures the European Civil Protection mechanism. In 
the meanwhile, the situation in Haiti was problematic as a result of previous political, 
social and economic factors. In addition, several other natural disasters after the 
earthquake (tornado, Hurricane Tomas, cholera epidemic) were further incommoding 
the humanitarian effort (Grünewald et. al., 2011: 16-17).  
 
Despite all these factors, the EU responded with a total amount of  €120 million in 
humanitarian aid. This is an enormous sum comparing to the €81 millions which were 
allocated to this country during the past 15 years of ECHO’s presence there. Despite 
this amount DG ECHO was only the 4th largest international donor behind the USA 
and other private contributors (Grünewald et. al., 2011: 8). In general, ECHO 
responded rapidly and provided organised plans and strategies to respond to the 
                                                 
9 http://www.theeuros.eu/Helping-the-most-vulnerable-around,2636?lang=en 
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different crises in Haiti, but it also set the proper context for the development policies 
through DG ECHO’s Strategy for 2011 (Grünewald et. al., 2011: 62).  
 
Nevertheless, there were several dysfunctions in its whole effort. Maybe the most 
prominent was that there was not enough communication with local population and 
the fact that there was no significant interaction with the national institutions 
(Grünewald et. al., 2011: 62). Moreover, ECHO was not well prepared to face the 
urban dimension of the crisis. Haiti is characterised by a major, and anarchic 
structured, urban concentration around the capital of Port-au-Prince (Grünewald et. 
al., 2011: 39).  
 
There were also observed problems of coordination. Although ECHO moved very fast 
and took advantage of previous humanitarian structures in the country, it was difficult 
initially to coordinate the great number of NGOs and the various organisations that 
appeared in Haiti. Moreover, all these NGOs and other partners were not always 
fulfilling the criteria that ECHO has set in order to provide them with funds. This had 
as a result, initially, several delays in the humanitarian effort (Grünewald et. al., 2011: 
19). Furthermore, the funds sometimes were allocated with “political” criteria and that 
had negative consequences to the quality of the programmes (World Food 
Programme’s Cash for Work; Grünewald et. al., 2011: 9). Another issue of 
coordination was the linking between relief and development. DG ECHO tried to 
establish the LRRD process, but its time frame was too short and there was lack of 
funding mechanisms on behalf of the EU’s development tools, which could pursue 
activities initiated by ECHO’s funds (Grünewald et. al., 2011: 63).  
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Another issue was the coordination between the military and humanitarian actors. 
Their relationship was not easy, particularly with the US army, and in several cases 
there were obstacles to the humanitarian work (Camp Corail, water filters; Grünewald 
et. al., 2011: 59). ECHO and its partners, although they collaborated to a degree with 
the military forces deployed in the country, usually stayed outside “the process of aid 
militarization (Grünewald et. al., 2011: 58). In any case, the EU Member States 
contributed with military means but also military specialised personnel following the 
context of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (Grünewald et. al., 2011: 
58)10
 
. Even so, the EU humanitarian policy was accused that it did not promote, as it 
should, EU’s international role. The High Representative of the EU Baroness Cathrin 
Ashton was criticised by MEPs that “Europe was not present” in Haiti. In fact that 
was not a fair criticism but it was based on the fact that the EU did not promote its 
overall significant aid in the eyes of the local population (Gowan, 2011). 
 Libya 
The case of Libya is the second example. In February 2011 (last year) it started a 
major political protest, which developed into a civil war and eventually resulted to the 
fall of Gaddaffi’s regime and his death. The European Commission and the Member 
States provided funds and resources initially to evacuate EU citizens from Libya and 
later thousands of migrant workers who have been stacked in neighbouring countries 
with no means of returning home11
                                                 
10 Signed in December 2007 by the three European Institutions (Council, Parliament and Commission) 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/consensus_en.htm 
. The European Commission, since the beginning 
of the Libyan crisis, provided with 80.5 million in humanitarian aid and 11 member 
states and Norway participated in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism “offering ships, 
planes and in-kind assistance” (ECHO, Aid in action). The European Commission 
11 Aid in action http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/north_africa_mid_east/libya_en.htm 
 20 
Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection department also sent in Libya teams of experts 
in order to “assess changing needs, to monitor the delivery of aid and to ensure 
coordination with aid organisations and donors” (ECHO, Aid in action). 
 
Libya’s civil war brought the EU officials in front of a complex set of political 
dilemmas, as it was clear that a huge humanitarian crisis was looming (Gowan, 2011). 
Nevertheless, there was not a clear EU political strategy to head off the crisis (Gowan, 
2011). The EU mobilised its major emergency instruments, the humanitarian 
assistance and the civil protection mechanism (Koenig, 2011: 4). By the end of May 
the EU and Member States had provided almost 145 million in humanitarian aid and 
civil protection constituting the EU as the biggest humanitarian donor in Libya12
 
. 
Nevertheless, the Libyan crisis so far highlights fundamental challenge in the EU’s 
humanitarian policies (Gowan, 2011) 
First of all, humanitarian aid, as it was stated in the Lisbon Treaty, constitutes one of 
these external policies, which can boost the EU’s international profile. In man-made 
crises though this is not so easy. Humanitarian aid should be apolitical and neutral in 
order to achieve its relief aims. In man-made crises instead there are clear political 
objectives and concerns. In Libya’s case the EU could not follow such a neutral 
approach, as it is not an apolitical and neutral organisation like the U.N. Refugee 
Agency (Gowan, 2011). Besides, several of its Member States participated in 
operations against one of the two sides (Gowan, 2011). Furthermore, wrong political 
management at the initial stage of its humanitarian initiative (Miozzo’s mission in 
Tripoli) further deteriorated the EU’s neutral profile (Gowan, 2011). 
                                                 
12 European Commission - ECHO, Libyan Crisis, Factsheet, 21 June 2011, 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/libya_factsheet.pdf. 
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In Libya’s case the EU’s humanitarian aid was quick and substantial (Koenig, 2011: 
13). Nevertheless, it’s presence, at least in the beginning of the crisis, was considered 
to be “thin on the ground”13
 
. That case highlights the issue of the “European 
Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps” (EVHAC). The idea of these corps, though, was 
never faced positively from other veteran humanitarian workers, who fear that this 
corps would be just “a bunch of inexperienced do-gooders” and that they will mostly 
promote EU instead of delivering aid (Gowan, 2011). Therefore, these corps, until this 
time, did not receive any special role in the EU humanitarian aid policies. Although 
the idea is still left open, it seems more probable that they will become a tool for 
training and pooling volunteers for humanitarian missions (Gowan, 2011). 
Another issue that emerged one more time from the Libyan crisis was the role of 
military means in humanitarian missions and particularly in man-made crisis. Such 
efforts in the past, in Bosnia in example, ended with great problems (Gowan, 2011). 
The EU recently used military means to promote humanitarian missions (Chad, 
Somalia, partly in Haiti). In Libya, except from the Member States that participated 
actively in the military operations, the EU deployed some military forces (ships, 
aircrafts) to get aid to the country (Gowan, 2011). Moreover, during the Libyan crisis, 
and particularly in March when the violence was escalating the EU started to discuss 
the possibility of a military mission to help aid effort. These discussions led to the 
decision of the 1st of April, which green-lighted the EUROFOR Libya (Gowan, 2011). 
That force would be deployed if requested by the UN OCHA (Office for the 
                                                 
13 Chaffin J. & Spiegel, P., “Humanitarian crisis tests EU’s policy”, Financial Times, Middle East & 
North Africa, Published: March 3 2011, 19:17,  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4a14f00c-45c8-11e0-acd8-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1cpsYUpD3 
 22 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) and it would have an Italian commander, 
headquarters in Rome and a mandate for four months (Koenig, 2011: 5-6). 
 
Eventually that force was never deployed. The EU’s humanitarian agencies did not 
see in a good way that force, as it was risking its presence on the ground, and its 
assistance was never asked. The creation of this force, also, highlights, the “uneasy 
balance between the EU’s political and humanitarian imperatives” (Gowan, 2011). 
The Member States saw the creation of EUROFOR Libya as an alternative to their 
political inaction and juxtaposition over whether to use military force against the 
Libyan regime (Gowan, 2011). Actually, the EUROFOR acted as a political 
symbolism against the real humanitarian logic (Gowan, 2011).  
 
 
Conclusion - Questions for the Future 
The Treaty of Lisbon set a new context over the EU’s humanitarian aid policies. The 
most important of its influence was that it granted a legal framework. It also tried to 
establish clear lines among the Union’s external actions. In addition, Lisbon Treaty 
constituted humanitarian aid an important tool in promoting the EU’s international 
prestige. In theory all these achievements are very significant. In practise there are 
several grey lines, which pose questions in the EU’s humanitarian aid policies.  
 
The overall, though, contribution of EU in humanitarian aid missions can be 
considered more than positive. The EU provides almost half of the humanitarian 
workers in the world (110,000) and contributes the most in financial terms (Gowan, 
2011). The Commission also gives significant importance to the so-called “forgotten 
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crises” mostly in Africa and has also gained the title of “donor of last resort” (Gowan, 
2011). This happened during the flood crisis in Pakistan in 2010, when most of the 
EU Member States could not provide any funds due to the crisis in Haiti. The 
European Commission and the UK assumed to fill this gap (Gowan, 2011).   
 
 Operational issues 
In any case, the EU’s humanitarian aid policies, as it was shown from the cases of 
Libya and Haiti, face several issues, which are closely connected with the EU’s 
international role. In operational terms there are issues of coordination between the 
EU and its partners. There is still the “grey zone” between humanitarian aid and 
development cooperation. The latter, however, has to do with the nature of these two 
policies, which are interconnected. One of the critics on the EU humanitarian aid 
policies towards this issue argues that the need of the EU to set long-term spending in 
advance, delays quick responses to crises and it causes funding problems14
 
. 
Nevertheless, the last decade these policy fields have managed to cooperate in a better 
way and it was avoided a “developmentalization” of humanitarian aid (Versluys, 
2007: 10).  
A possible problem, however, for humanitarian aid and development policies can be 
the current financial crisis. Several EU members have reduced their contributions, but 
for the time being their contributions have been replaced by Germany, the Nordic 
countries and the UK, which have increased theirs (Gowan, 2011). In the future, 
though, this condition is not quite sure. 
 
                                                 
14 Heather Gabbe, Head of the “Open Society Foundation”, in Chaffin J. & Spiegel, P., “Humanitarian 
crisis tests EU’s policy”, Financial Times, Middle East & North Africa, Published: March 3 2011, 
19:17,  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4a14f00c-45c8-11e0-acd8-00144feab49a.html#axzz1cpsYUpD3 
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With the Lisbon Treaty it was also defined that “the Union shall ensure that its 
humanitarian aid operations are coordinated and consistent with those of international 
organizations and bodies, in particular those forming part of the United Nations 
system” (Art. 214, 7). Indeed, the EU’s cooperation with the UN agencies is so close 
that some critics argue that the EU humanitarian workers are more like UN 
humanitarian workers than Europeans (Gowan, 2011). Actually, the governments of 
EU Member States prefer the UN leadership in such missions and it’s unlikely to 
switch this support (Gowan, 2011). This however poses some questions over the EU’s 
political profile in the aid system.  
 
 Political issues 
The Treaty of Lisbon aims to turn the EU a visible player in international relations 
with a coherent external policy. Nevertheless, the often lack of a consistent strategy in 
external action constitutes the EU’s humanitarian aid and development policies as the 
only means towards this. This, eventually, connects humanitarian aid policies with the 
EU’s political aims and international identity. This connection certainly affects the 
role and competencies of the EU’s humanitarian aid policies. Thus, there are 
identified three strategic objectives for the EU where each one of them has not only 
operational implications but also political as they foresee a different international 
profile for the EU (Gowan, 2011).  
 
The first strategic objective sees the EU as a neutral humanitarian agency within the 
frames of the UN (Gowan, 2011). To a degree, the EU’s response to the Haiti crisis is 
such an example. The objection towards this strategy is that the EU is something more 
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that a neutral international organisation. It has political aspirations and interests, 
which such a perspective cannot satisfy.  
 
The second strategy sees the EU as “unique type of civilian power” with a stronger, 
more visible and more independent humanitarian aid policy (Gowan, 2011). This is, 
actually, the aim of the Lisbon Treaty and the lack of this visibility and independence 
was the reason of the criticism during the Haiti crisis. Nevertheless, the Member 
States do not in all cases, and particularly in man-made crises, appear willing to move 
independently from the UN. This argument leads to the third strategy, which applies 
mostly to man-made crises.  
 
This strategy demands a coherent external policy and, in several cases, promotes a 
closer cooperation of the EU’s humanitarian aid missions with EU’s military means. 
This approach identifies the EU a “self-consciously well-intentioned military power” 
(Gowan, 2011). This option though faces the greatest opposition, not only from 
humanitarian workers, but also from the same the EU Member States, which are not 
willing to accept such an international role for the EU.  
 
In the future, definitely there will be natural and man-made crises and in each 
occasion the EU should pursue the proper humanitarian response. The Lisbon Treaty 
has provided with a legal framework the EU’s external actions and connected 
humanitarian aid with its political aspirations. Therefore, there must be found a 
balance among humanitarian aid, development policy and foreign policy. Otherwise, 
humanitarian aid becomes null and void and the EU’s role as an international actor is 
diminished. This is more obvious in man-made crises, where even military 
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instruments need to be employed. It is not sure which road the EU will eventually 
follow, but it’s sure that its political identity is reflected to its responses towards 
humanitarian crises.  
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